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CCR, which provides for the issuance of
temporary occupational licenses by
CHRB and sets forth the conditions under
which such licenses may become permanent; at this writing, the amendments are
being reviewed by OAL. [ 12:4 CRLR
221}

■ LEGISLATION
SB 29 (Maddy). Existing law provides
for the distribution to the horsemen as
purses of a portion of the total amount
wagered on horse races. As introduced
December 7, this bill would require that an
amount equal to not less than 15% of the
total purses paid be dedicated and set aside
as purses for California-bred races, as described. [S. GO]

■ LITIGATION
In Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
v. State of California, No. CIV-S-90-1118DR.,, the Cabazon and Sycuan Bands of
Mission Indians sought a determination from
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California that the state of California may not impose license fees on its
on-reservation betting facilities for simulcast horse racing. The plaintiffs---collectively called "the Tribes" by the courtargued that the license fees are a direct tax
on them that is barred by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C.
section 2701 et seq., and the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity. Specifically,
one provision of the IGRA provides that
"[e]xcept for any assessments that may be
agreed to [to permit the state to recover its
costs ofregulation], nothing in this section
shall be interpreted as conferring upon a
State ... authority to impose any tax, fee,
charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe ... engag[ing] in a class III activity." Although the parties disagreed about
whether California has jurisdiction to collect its license fee based on revenues generated at the Tribes' simulcast operations,
the parties agreed that the fees are taxes,
even though they are called license fees.
The court acknowledged that relevant
portions of the IGRA "constitute a prohibition on direct taxation of revenues generated by tribes, other than that necessary
to reimburse the state for the cost of its
regulatory activities." However, the court
noted that the IGRA "consistently speaks
only to direct taxation," and that the issue
presented is whether the license fees,
which are levied on the racing associations and which affect the Tribes only
indirectly, are an impermissible burden on
the Tribes. The court found that a "primary
purpose of IGRA was to create an arena in
which Indian tribes could compete on an
equal footing with non-Indian entities, 'to
132

achieve a fair balancing of competitive
economic interests.'" According to the
court, California seeks to treat revenue
generated by racing associations on Indian
lands in precisely the same fashion as it
treats revenue generated on non-Indian
lands; the court held that such a tax furthers the twin goals of equality and uniformity in regulation. Based on IGRA's silence as to indirect taxation, and Congress'
intent that Class III tribal gaming be
treated equally to non-Indian gaming, the
court concluded that IGRA does not preempt the tax at issue here.
In response to the Tribes' contention
that the tax is invalid as an impermissible
intrusion on the Tribes' sovereignty, the
court considered-among other thingsthe economic and administrative burden
on the tribe and the extent and cost of state
regulation and state services provided.
The court noted that if California cannot
tax the revenues derived from betting at
simulcast facilities located on the Tribes'
lands, those revenues would be distributed
50% to the racing associations and 50% as
purses to horsemen who participate in the
races; because the Tribes do not have the
responsibility of paying the taxes, and
have no right to the revenues if the taxes
were to go unpaid, the court found that the
license fees do not impose an economic
burden on the Tribes. Also, the court found
that no additional administrative burden is
placed on the Tribes by collection of the
monies ultimately used by the racing associations to pay the license fees; under
state law, the Tribes must turn over to the
racing associations all monies received
from wagering except for the percentage
to which they are entitled as simulcast
facility operators. The court also found
that the presence of horse racing in California requires the state to support additional law enforcement and tax collection
bureaucracies, as well as establish and
operate the extensive administration that
oversees the horse racing industry, and
concluded that "[e]ven if the state revenues were disproportionately larger than
state expenses, the lack of proportionality
does not make the tax an impermissible
burden on the tribes." Finally, the court
noted that when the nature of an activity
that a state seeks to tax is unrelated to
traditional Indian activity and consists of
taking advantage of an exemption not
available to non-Indians, an indirect tax
will be upheld, and acknowledged that
"[g]aming is a major source of employment on Indian reservations," with tribes
making large investments in building and
maintaining gaming facilities. Accordingly, the court concluded that the license
fees California collects from the horse rac-
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ing associat10ns which broadcast their
races to on-reservation betting operations
are neither preempted by IGRA nor a violation of the Tribes' sovereign immunity.

■ FUTURE MEETINGS
June 25 in Sacramento.
July 29 in Del Mar.
August 27 in Del Mar.
September 24 in San Mateo.

NEW MOTOR VEHICLE
BOARD
Executive Officer:
Sam W. Jennings
(916) 445-1888
ursuant to Vehicle Code section 3000
P
et seq., the New Motor Vehicle Board
(NMVB) licenses new motor vehicle dealerships and regulates dealership relocations and manufacturer terminations of
franchises. It reviews disciplinary action
taken against dealers by the Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV). Most licensees
deal in cars or motorcycles.
NMVB is authorized to adopt regulations to implement its enabling legislation; the Board's regulations are codified
in Chapter 2, Division I, Title 13 of the
California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The Board also handles disputes arising
out of warranty reimbursement schedules.
After servicing or replacing parts in a car
under warranty, a dealer is reimbursed by
the manufacturer. The manufacturer sets
reimbursement rates which a dealer occasionally challenges as unreasonable. Infrequently, the manufacturer's failure to
compensate the dealer for tests performed
on vehicles is questioned.
The Board consists of four dealer
members and five public members. The
Board's staff consists of an executive secretary, three legal assistants and two secretaries.

■ MAJOR PROJECTS
Board Considers Protest Regarding
Franchise Termination. On November 5,
NMVB and an administrative law judge
(ALJ) heard a protest filed by Toyota of
Visalia (TOY) against Toyota Motor Distributors, Inc. (Toyota) concerning Toyota's
proposed termination ofTOV's franchise.
Toyota's request for termination of the
franchise was based on its belief that TOY
had deceived clients and Toyota, breached
Toyota's dealer agreement, mistreated and
abused employees, and committed over
150 counts of consumer fraud. Additionally, Toyota contended that its dealership
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agreement with TOY states that Toyota
may tenninate the franchise ifNMVB suspends TOY for seven days or longer;
Toyota argued that because NMVB has
suspended TOY for thirty days, Toyota is
authorized under the agreement to tenninate TOV's franchise.
TOY denied Toyota's claims and requested that NMVB reexamine the evidence before it allows Toyota to tenninate
th.e franchise. The Board and the ALJ took
the evidence under consideration; at this
writing, the Board is expected to announce
its decision in early 1993.

■ LITIGATION
In Ray Fladeboe Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc., v. New Motor Vehicle Board, Jaguar
Cars, Inc., et al., Real Parties in Interest,
No. B060651 (Sept. 14, 1992), Fladeboe
sought to overturn the decision of respondent NMVB which allowed real party in
interest Jaguar Cars, Inc. (Jaguar) to terminate Fladeboe's Jaguar dealership, and
rejected Fladeboe's petition seeking damages for Jaguar's assertedly wrongful conduct in the allocation of vehicles among
its dealers. The Second District Court of
Appeal concluded that the trial court properly denied Fladeboe's petition for writ of
mandate, substantial evidence supports
NMVB's findings, Fladeboe received a
full and fair hearing before NMVB, and
NMVB had jurisdiction to hear Fladeboe's
petition claims.
Fladeboe contended that NMVB
Jacked jurisdiction under Vehicle Code
section 3050(c)(2) to arbitrate the dispute
between Fladeboe and Jaguar; that section
states in part that the Board shall consider
any matter concerning the activities or
practices of any person applying for or
holding a license as a new motor vehicle
dealer, manufacturer, manufacturer branch,
distributor, distributor branch, or representative submitted by any person. After
such consideration, NMVB may do any
one or any combination of the following:
direct the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) to conduct an investigation of
matters that the Board deems reasonable,
and make a written report on the results of
the investigation to NMVB; undertake to
mediate, arbitrate, or otherwise resolve
any honest difference of opinion or viewpoint existing between any member of the
public and any new motor vehicle dealer,
manufacturer, manufacturer branch, distributor branch, or representative; or order
DMV to exercise any and all authority or
power that it may have with respect to the
issuance, renewal, refusal to renew, suspension, or revocation of the license of
any new motor vehicle dealer.

Fladeboe asserted that section 3050(c)(2)
addresses only differences of opinion between any "member of the public and any
new motor vehicle dealer, manufacturer,
manufacturer branch, distributor branch,
or representative." Fladeboe argued that
the term "member of the public" refers to
individuals served by the new motor vehicle industry, and claimed that the disputes
described in section 3050(c)(2) do not include differences between new motor vehicle businesses. Fladeboe contended that
the directive to "consider" matters under
section 3050(c) is to be contrasted with
language in subsections 3050(b) and (d)
which directs the Board to "hear and consider" protests and appeals by franchisees
and licensees.
The Second District noted that, although the Board possesses only such
power as has been conferred upon it by
statute, the cases of Yamaha Motor Corp.
v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 3d 1232
(1986) (Yamaha I), and Yamaha Motor
Corp. v. Superior Coun, 195 Cal. App. 3d
652 (I 987) (Yamaha JI), have held that
section 3050(c) confers upon NMVB the
authority to consider any matter concerning the activities or practices of any person
holding a license as a new motor vehicle
dealer, manufacturer, or representative
submitted by any person.
However, Fladeboe argued that the
more recent decision in Ri-Joyce, Inc. v.
New Motor Vehicle Board, 2 Cal. App. 4th
445 ( 1992), undermines the holdings of
Yamaha I and Yamaha II; the Ri-Joyce
court commented that NMVB is a quasijudicial administrative agency of limited
jurisdiction, which does not have plenary
authority to resolve any and all disputes
which may arise between a franchisor and
a franchisee. [/2:2&3 CRLR 255] According to Ri-Joyce, NMVB's ')urisdiction under section 3060 encompasses disputes arising over the attempted tennination, replacement or modification of a
franchise agreement. Claims arising from
disputes with other legal bases must be
directed to a different forum."
In response to Fladeboe's argument,
the Second District held that it disagrees
with Ri-Joyce to the extent that it held that
NMVB lacks authority over disputes involving the termination of franchises
whenever a claim of impropriety is based
upon estoppel or fraud. The court based its
decision on the findings that Ri-Joyce
failed to mention or consider Yamaha I
and Yamaha II; segregation of claims otherwise proper for the Board's consideration, based upon the underlying basis of
the claim, would allow franchisees to circumvent NMVB's jurisdiction through
artful pleading; and the Ri-Joyce rule
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would require franchisees to pursue simultaneous actions before NMVB and in
state court, wreak havoc with the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, and defeat the
public policy which favors resolution of
franchise disputes before the administrative agency.
On December 31, the California Supreme Court denied Fladeboe's petition
for review.

■ FUTURE MEETINGS
To be announced.

OSTEOPATHIC
MEDICAL BOARD OF
CALIFORNIA
Executive Director:
Linda Bergmann
(916) 322-4306
n 1922, California voters approved a
constitutional initiative which created
the Board of Osteopathic Examiners;
1991 legislation changed the Board's
name to the Osteopathic Medical Board of
California (OMBC). Today, pursuant to
Business and Professions Code section
3600 et seq., OMBC regulates entry into
the osteopathic profession, examines and
approves schools and colleges of osteopathic medicine, and enforces professional standards. The Board is empowered
to adopt regulations to implement its enabling legislation; OMBC's regulations
are codified in Division 16, Title 16 of the
California Code of Regulations (CCR).
The 1922 initiative, which provided for a
five-member Board consisting of practicing doctors of osteopathy (DOs), was
amended in 1982 to include two public
members. The Board now consists of
seven members, appointed by the Governor, serving staggered three-year terms.
Two new members were recently appointed to OMBC by Governor Wilson.
They are Michael A. Danforth, DO, an
osteopathic physician from Fullerton, and
Robert P. David, director of national accounts for the Sutter Corporation in San
Diego. Board member Stanley L.K.
Flemming recently resigned from OMBC,
leaving the Board with one vacant DO
position.
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■ MAJOR PROJECTS
Continuing Medical Education. At its
December 12 meeting in Irvine, OMBC
discussed modifying its existing continuing medical education (CME) requirements. Under section 1635, Division 16,
Title 16 of the CCR, OMBC currently
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